In the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but, instead, interact only with their neighbors, thus mimicking the existing of a social or contact network that defines who interacts with whom. In this work, we explore evolutionary, spatial PD systems consisting of two types of agents, each with a certain update (reproduction, learning) rule. We investigate two different scenarios: in the first case, update rules remain fixed for the entire evolution of the system; in the second case, agents update both strategy and update rule in every generation. Our results show that, for an important range of the parameters of the game, the final state of the system is largely different from that arising from the usual setup of a single, fixed dynamical rule. Furthermore, the results are also very different if update rules are fixed or evolve with the strategies. In these respect, we have studied representative update rules, finding that some of them may become extinct while others prevail. We describe the new and rich variety of final outcomes that arise from this coevolutionary dynamics. Our results pave the way to an evolutionary rationale for modelling social interactions through game theory with a preferred set of update rules.
Introduction
The quest for the origins of the cooperative behavior observed in nature, in many different species or at different biological levels, from molecules to individuals, is an exciting project that has received much attention in the last decades [Darwin, 1871; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry, 1995; Hammerstein, 2003] . Evolutionary game theory has been one of the most successful frameworks to address this issue in a quantitative manner [Gintis, 2000; Nowak, 2006b; Pennisi, 2005] and by allowing a stylization of the main strategic interactions and social dilemmas, has provided many insights into the reasons of the emergence of cooperation.
A particularly fruitful line of research has focused on the interactions between two individuals, trying to explain cooperative behaviors in a population with a bottom-up approach. In this context, interactions are modelled by means of 2x2 games, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma [Rapoport and Chammah, 1965] or the Hawk-Dove game [Maynard-Smith, 1982] . These games have proven themselves relevant in situations arising in biochemistry [Frick and Schuster, 2003] , cooperation between bacteria [Crespi, 2001] , mutualistic interactions [Kiers et al., 2003] , fish [Dugatkin and Mesterton-Gibbons, 1996] and, of course, human societies [Kollock, 1998 ].
Within the framework of evolutionary game theory, a number of explanations have been proposed to understand the origin of cooperation [Nowak, 2006a] . In this work, we focus on one of them, namely the existence of a spatial structure, as such or as a representation of a social network. Indeed, many studies have pointed out that certain types of spatial structure foster cooperation in simple two-player symmetric games, beginning with the pioneering work by Nowak and May [1992] . Subsequent papers [Nowak and May, 1993; Hauert, 2002 Hauert, , 2006 Santos et al., 2006a,b; Jiménez et al., 2008; Lozano et al., 2008; Gardeñes et al., 2008; Langer et al., 2008] analysed different aspects of the emergence of cooperation in spatial games and as a conclusion of this work the general idea that spatial structures supported cooperative behaviors began to shape up. For a comprehensive summary of all the recent work on evolutionary game theory on graphs, see the review by Szabó and Fáth [2007] .
Recently, some authors have questioned the generality of the above assertion, at least as far as other games are concerned. Thus, Hauert and Doebeli [2004] and Sysi-Aho et al. [2005] have shown that spatial structure may decrease the cooperation level attained in the Hawk-Dove game as compared to that observed in a well-mixed population. Following this result, some researchers have looked in detail into the different reports and found that the phenomenon of the emergence of cooperation, when truly existing, turns out to be dependent on the microscopic update rules used in the simulation. In other words, it is possible that within the same game, played in the same spatial structure, cooperation arises or not depending on the way the players change their strategy during evolution. This is the case, for instance, when playing Prisoner's Dilemma on a square lattice: whereas unconditional imitation (see below for a description of this and the rest of update rules studied in this paper) gives rise to cooperation [Nowak and May, 1992] , replicator dynamics leads to full defection [Roca et al., 2008] .
In view of this situation, in this paper we aim to going beyond the approach that has been traditionally used in the study of spatial games. Specifically, we intend to provide an evolutionary rationale for choosing a particular update rule in the implementation of spatial models of cooperation. To this end, we will allow agents to update not only their strategies but also the update rule itself. The outcome of these simulations will show whether or not all update rules are equally likely to appear in a structured population and, if not, which ones are evolutionarily selected. One can then compare this conclusion to the scenarios of emergence of cooperation on networks and discuss the applicability of the different results already known.
In this paper we address the co-evolution of strategies and update rules in a two-step process. In order to have a reference, a first step in our approach is the comparison of mixed systems, consisting of agents with different (but fixed during evolution) update rules, with the emergence of cooperation in pure single-dynamics systems. Already at this stage we find differences between the two scenarios which are worth describing; on the other hand, this is a necessary reference frame to understand the subsequent results of co-evolution. Indeed, after this first step, we proceed to let update rules evolve along with strategies. In this situation, we find new results that differ both from the single-rule case and from the mixed-rule case. We will describe the results of our simulations and in the conclusions we summarize our findings and discuss their implications for the emergence of cooperation.
Model
Our model is based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game [Rapoport and Chammah, 1965 ]. An archetype in game theory, the PD game belongs to a general class of symmetric games that consist of two players or agents that confront, each with a definite strategy: either to cooperate or to defect with the opposite player. Each combination of strategies between the players has an associated payoff, and hence there are four possible outcomes: if the player cooperates, the associated payoff she gets is S if the other player chooses to defect, or R > S, if the other player reciprocates the cooperation. On the other hand, if the first agent defects, her payoff is P , if the other also defects, or T > P , if the other cooperates. The PD corresponds to any choice of payoffs ordered according to T > R > P > S. It is customary to assume that 2R > T + S to avoid that players take turns at defecting and win a larger payoff than the one they would have just cooperating. We will stick to this constraint although in our case we deal with one-shot, non-repeated games because strategies and payoffs are updated after every single game, and hence strictly speaking we need not impose this condition. In the rest of this work, we will adopt the commonly-used rescaled payoff T = b, R = 1, and P = S = 0 [Nowak and May, 1992] . This does not affect the general essence of the game, and reduces the study to just one free parameter, usually called the temptation parameter. Nevertheless, we checked the robustness of our simulations by comparing some cases with the choice S = −0.2, finding very approximately the same results.
In the evolutionary version of the PD game, N agents play between them, and after every instance of the game they decide whether to change strategies or not according to some microscopic update rule. In a well-mixed situation, each player plays every other once and afterwards they proceed to the update stage. In our case, as we are interested in the rules that can promote cooperation in a spatially structured population, the players are located at the nodes of a square lattice, where each agent is connected with her four closest neighbors and plays the game only with those neighbors. The reason we have chosen a square lattice is that it is a well studied model [Nowak and May, 1992; Hauert, 2002; Roca et al., 2008; Langer et al., 2008] in the single-update rule framework, and therefore we can compare our results to those previous works. The sequence of steps for the simulation is as follows: Each player is assigned, randomly and with equal probability, an initial strategy of cooperation (C) or defection (D), and a payoff, initially set to zero. In each generation, all agents play PD once with each neighbour, with an associated payoff for each game, collecting a total final payoff for each player. After each generation, all agents update their strategies simultaneously, according to a certain update rule (defined separately), that may depend on the agent's payoff and her neighbour's, and that defines the dynamics of the game. Once defined, for all players, what the strategy for the next generation will be, all payoffs are reset to zero and the cycle starts over.
As we have said, the new ingredient of our model is twofold: two different update rules and the possibility that the update rules themselves evolve. Therefore, in our model players may be set to have rule A or rule B, where A and B stand for specific dynamical rules that will be explained below. In this way, each player has its own individual dynamical rule. Within this framework, we devised two possible alternatives. In the first case, agents are assigned their dynamical rule, that remains fixed for the rest of the simulation. In the second case, agents may change their dynamical rule during the game according to a simple criterion: an agent copies the dynamical rule from its neighbour whenever it copies its strategy. This can be interpreted as a complete replacement of one agent for another agent's offspring, which may be convenient or useful in certain descriptions. This interpretation is suitable for both biological and sociological situations, in this last case in terms of culture transmission and learning. Furthermore, the possibility of variable update rules implies an evolution (and therefore a competition) of the rules themselves. If as a consequence of this evolution one rule, or a restricted set of rules, are selected, the results on the emergence of cooperation on lattices will have to be revisited again in the light of our findings.
We implement three of the most representative, and most commonly considered, dynamical rules: the unconditional imitation (UI, a.k.a. as imitatethe-best) rule, the Moran (MOR) rule and the replicator (REP) rule. Unconditional imitation is a completely deterministic rule: at the end of each generation, an agent simply adopts the strategy of her neighbour with the highest payoff (i.e., the most successful one), given that this neighbour has a greater payoff. Note also that this rule checks the payoff of all the neighbors of the agent whose strategy is to be updated. In this sense we will refer to this strategy as global (not to be confused with global in terms of the whole lattice). In the replicator dynamics, an agent randomly chooses another agent (in our case, one of its four neighbours) and, if the chosen agent has a higher payoff, the original one adopts that neighbour's strategy with a probability proportional to the difference of payoffs between the two. In this case, we are faced with a local update rule, that does not look at all the updating agent's neighbourhood. Another important remark is that, in our model, an agent having an imitation or replicator rule will never adopt another strategy (or rule) that performed worse. Finally, in a Moran process, the agent, at the end of each generation, evaluates a set of probabilities, one for each neighbour and proportional to that neighbour's payoff. Then the agent randomly selects a neighbour's strategy according to that set of probabilities. In this case, there is a possibility that an agent adopts a strategy that performed worse in a previous round. On the other hand, this is again a global rule, in the same sense as we referred above to the imitiation one.
Results
To study our model, we performed a series of numerical experiments for both cases, namely with fixed and with variable update rules, for the same set of game parameters. Each experiment consists in a population of N = 10 4 agents, spatially arranged in a square lattice. Generally speaking, each agent is endowed initially with one of two available dynamical rules, A or B (where A and B stand for UI, MOR or REP), and one of two possible strategies, C or D. To monitor the evolution of the system we will observe the frequency or density of a certain type of player, for example those that are cooperators or those with a certain update rule. Thus, we define f A to be the number of agents with rule A divided by N, and f C the number of cooperator agents divided by N. Every experiment is characterised by an initial density of cooperators f C (t = 0) (or in a simpler notation, f C (0)) and by an initial fraction of agents with rule A, f A (0). In this way, f C will generally change. The homogeneous case (all agents with the same update rule) is recovered by choosing f A (0) = 1. To simplify the parameter space of our simulations, we only considered initial strategies assigned randomly and with equal probability, i.e. f C (0) = 0.5 in all experiments, independent of the update rule considered. All numerical simulations run for T = 10 4 generations or time steps, for a given value of b. Within this duration equilibration was achieved (often much earlier), i.e., the densities reached their asymptotic values and remain there within small fluctuations.
Fixed update rules
We begin by looking at the simplest case of agents that can have two different update rules but they cannot change them during evolution. In this case, f A = f A (0) and remains constant for all times. It is useful to analyse the normalised fraction of cooperators of, say, rule A, which we will refer to as A first finding arising from our experiments is that the initial fraction of the populations, f A (0) may affect greatly the final cooperator outcome. Consider for instance the left panel of Fig. 1 , where we show an example of a system with fixed rules, plotting, for a population of UI and REP, the final (equilibrium) value of the relative cooperator density µ T U I and µ T REP as a function of f U I (0). We indeed observe that the initial ratio of agent types has a significant effect on the final outcome of the simulations. This is particularly so in the case of UI (solid line): There is an intermediate value f U I (0) ∼ 0.75 of the total initial fraction f U I (0) for which the ratio µ T U I of UI cooperators to total number of UI is minimum. We have not been able to provide a rationale for the appearance of such a non-monotonic behavior, which is specific for UI players. Actually, in the case of REP agents (dashed line), we get another interesting result: The initial fraction of replicator agents f REP (0) = 1 − f U I (0) is approximately proportional to the amount of replicator cooperators within the replicator population, µ REP being smaller (larger) than 0.5 whenever f REP (0) is smaller (larger) than 0.5. While this may look intuitive, it must be recalled that when the population consists only of REP agents, the cooperators die out for any value of the temptation parameter b. Regarding the time evolution of the experiment, the right panel of Fig. 1 shows two examples of the evolution of the normalized fraction µ U I for different values of the initial fraction of imitators f U I (0). There is always an initial drop of µ U I and a final relaxation to a value µ T that, as stated before, depends on f U I (0). Having considered the effect of different populations of update rules, let us now discuss the dependence on the temptation parameter b, and let us compare the results for the homogeneous case (all agents equal) with the case where two different rules are present. As a specific example, in Fig. 2 we plot, for the same game as before, the dependence of the total cooperator density as a function of the parameter b for the homgeneous case f U I (0) = 1 and for a mixed case with fixed f U I (0) = 0.75. For the homogeneous case, using the fact that unconditional imitation is a deterministic rule, one can show that f U I depends on b in a step-like fashion, changing when b is , in perfect agreement with the results of our simulations. As we may see from the plot, this functional dependence changes when there are replicators among the imitators. We find that the effect of the replicators is to lower the amount of total cooperators for a the whole range of values of b corresponding to the PD, e.g. b ≥ 1. In this respect, it is interesting to look at how the fraction of cooperators changes relative to the population with the same rule. This is also plotted in , even though the total cooperator density is lower than in the pure UI case, the cooperative imitators are a fraction larger than the total average, whereas the replicators are less than the average. On the other hand, for b > 4 3 , defectors take over the entire population, so µ U I = µ REP = 0. This means that the level of cooperation attained for a pure UI population in the PD suffer a considerable decrease or are totally suppressed by the presence of a minority of REP agents (we have checked with populations as small as f REP = 0.01 obtaining similar results). This is an indication that results such as the promotion of cooperation on the PD on lattices found by Nowak and May [1992] may not be robust against the presence of other types of update strategists, and therefore that their applicability must be studied depending on the way individual agents behave. 
Variable dynamical rule
In the previous subsection, we have reported that the presence of two different update rules in the population may considerably change the behavior of the PD on a lattice, the general conclusion being that the level of cooperation is lower than for the pure UI population. This result must be kept in mind when analysing the outcome of allowing the update rules themselves to evolve, the issue which we focus upon in the following. When agents are allowed to switch their update rule when updating their strategies, then the fraction of agents of rules A and B, f A , f B , will generally change. Indeed, in this case, we will see that, for certain values of the game parameters, a rule can completely overtake the system as the other one disappears, yielding different outcomes than the ones obtained with fixed update rules, or with just one update rule.
To begin with, let us present and discuss a specific example: In Fig. 3 we collect the results for the competition between UI agents versus MOR agents. On the top panel we show the cooperator frequency evolution with fixed update rules, i.e., when agents cannot change their update rules. We clearly observe that the total cooperator fraction f C disappears at about t ∼ 300. Note that both UI and MOR cooperators disappear at about the same time as defectors take over the entire population, in agreement with our conclusion of the previous subsection that inhomogeneous agents lead to lower levels of cooperation. Subsequently, let us consider the bottom panel of Fig. 3 , where we show a simulation under the same conditions with the only difference that in this case agents also copy their neighbour's update rule if they copy their (C or D) strategy. Opposite to the situations with fixed update rules, not only the total fraction of cooperators does not disappear, but also we find that cooperators end up forming about three quarters of the total population. Analysing the individual rules, we see that MOR cooperators disappear roughly at the same pace (actually, a little faster than in the fixed rule case), so all cooperators remaining are of the UI type. Remarkably, UI agents completely replace MOR agents in spite of the fact that the initial fraction of imitators in this simulation is f U I (0) = 0.12.
We could continue our discussion of specific examples but, to avoid a very lengthy description, let us only mention that other interesting outcomes may appear depending on the game parameters and update rule combinations. For instance, it is possible to see a coexistence of cooperators of one rule with defectors of the other rule, as occurs for imitators versus Moran agents with f U I (t = 0) < 0.5 and b = 1.05. However, as we are more interested in general conclusions than on a detailed classification of all the possible outcomes, we will switch to a more general viewpoint in what follows.
We will now discuss the dependence of the results on the temptation parameter b. In fact, as agents are now allowed to change the dynamical rules, both the fraction of cooperators, f C , and the fraction of agents with rule A, f A , may change, so it is relevant to ask what is the dependence on the temptation parameter b for both of these quantities. In fig. 4 we show our results for the case of UI and MOR agents, as a function of b. We see that depending on the value of b, the interaction affects the final fraction of cooperators to a large extent. Comparing with the homogeneous UI case, we observe that the two curves differ when 1 < b < 1.1 and b > 3 2 , both with a lower fraction of cooperators. The plot also allows to conclude that the reason for this is related to the value of the final fraction of imitator agents f U I , depicted in fig.  4 (cf. right axis): UI agents have increased in number (almost doubling their frequency from the initial value f U I (0) = 0.12) but, nevertheless, they have not been able to establish a cooperation level of the order of that observed in the homogeneous UI case for b > 3 2
. On the other hand, we see that, in regions of the b parameter where f U I = 1, the fraction of cooperators corresponds (necessarily) to the pure imitator case, but wherever the fraction f U I is less than one, the total cooperator number is lower.
Discussion
As we have already said, our goal in this work is to extract general conclusions, and therefore we will now proceed to summarize the main results of our experiments. We simulated three possible competitions, namely UI vs MOR, UI vs REP, and REP vs. MOR, for both fixed and variable update rules, exploring the whole interval of temptation values as well as initial conditions with Fig. 4 . Density of cooperators f C and density of imitators f U I as a function of the temptation parameter b, for the UI vs. MOR game. Simulation time is T = 10 4 . In thick solid line, we show f C for the case of a population composed by imitators only. In dashed line, we present the same quantity for a mixed system with f U I (0) = 0.12. In thin solid line, the final fraction of imitators (both cooperators and defectors). All quantities are averages of over 30 realisations.
different composition for each case. For a large region of the parameter space, the most common result is the extinction of at least one type of agent, i.e., one of the update rules goes extinct being replaced by the other one, or one of the strategies C or D prevails over the other. Nevertheless, we have also found a relatively small set of parameters when agents coexist with different update rules. To name just one example, this is so for UI vs MOR, 1 < b < 1.2 and f U I (0) not very close to 1. Furthermore, our results show that, when varying rules is allowed, the dominant update rule is REP, in the sense that in most situations it overcomes the other rules even if its initial population is small.
We believe that the prevalence of REP is a consequence of its own dynamic mechanism, that has a built-in tendency to avoid changing its rule relative to the other dynamics tested in this work. Indeed, if we compare the definitions of the three dynamics, we notice that UI agents always updates its strategy (and consequently its update rule), excepting when the other agent has less or equal payoff; MOR agents have a set of probabilities that will always trigger the rule updating, unless all probabilities are zero, as in the very particular case of zero payoff for all neighbours (for example, in a defector-only population). Otherwise also the MOR agents update their rule with large probability, even adopting another rule with less payoff, leading to the preservation of a rule that performed poorer; and, finally, a REP agent randomly chooses a neighbour, and then assigns a probability to adopt its rule proportional to the payoff difference between both agents. For this rule there is only one possibility for having certainty of the rule update, and this is the case where all neighbours are defectors fully surrounded by cooperators, and the updating agent is a cooperator, in turn fully surrounded by defectors (in a chessboard-like fashion). In this case we have certainty because of our normalization factor for the probability, but it could even be the case that larger normalisation factors were used, which would lead to a large but smaller than 1 probability to change. With this in mind, we monitored the fraction of agents of rule A (B) that update their rule relative to the total population having rule A (B), in each generation, called ξ A (ξ B ). As an illustration of the observed behaviours, in Fig. 5 we plot this quantity for the same case as fig. 3 (bottom panel) , i.e., UI vs MOR agents. The fraction of changing Moran agents rapidly becomes higher than that of imitators, and before 100 time steps is (and remains) much higher. We repeated this observation for many other cases as well and, in general, our results confirm that, in most cases, REP agents change their strategy and update rule much less frequently in comparison to the other dynamics. In some cases, this difference may be an order of magnitude smaller for the replicator rule. On the other hand the rule that updates the most is the Moran dynamics. Once again, this is consistent with our results: Most times, MOR agents disappear completely when confronting REP agents, and they survive in a restricted interval 1 < b < 1.1 against UI, never being more than half of the final population (see fig. 4 , thin solid line), whereas for change their rule more frequently, and replicators appear to be systematically the major part of the population. In order to further investigate the hypothesis that the fraction of changing agents determine their prevalence, we deviced the following experiment: We performed simulations with a similar setup as before, but in this case one of the populations updates their strategies and rules only at times t = nτ , with n = 0, 1, 2 . . ., being τ fixed (these would be "slow" agents). In fig. 6 we see an example for normal REP agents against slow MOR agents. These results confirm our hypothesis: With τ = 10 1 , replicators prevail as usual (top panel), whereas for a sufficiently high update time, τ = 10 2 , MOR agents prosper, and replicators tend to become extint (bottom panel). However, while this is an appealing mechanism, we have also established that it cannot be the only responsible for the prevalence of strategies. As an additional check, we considered the situation where agents of the same kind are put together, the inhomogeneity being only that they can be "normal" or "slow", i.e., that there is one fraction with a different τ . In fig. 7 we show the result of normal UI vs slow UI (see parameters in caption), where we observe that for several values of the temptation parameter b, there is still a fraction of normal agents. If our hypothesis above were the only reason for the survival of one strategy, the result should be that slow UI would always take over the entire population, but this is clearly no the case. Indeed, normal agents only dissapear whenever . We obtained similar results for a wide range of τ , up to τ = 10 3 . This indicates that, for agents of the same type, the overall rule selection mechanism is not straightforward and should be further studied, and we believe that the conclusions would also carry over to the two update rule case. A last point we want to remark from a general viewpoint is the following. Within our simulation procedure, a population composed only by defectors do not interact. Indeed, in this case the only available payoff is P = 0 independent of the agent's update rule. REP or UI will not update their rule (they do so only with more successful neighbours), and MOR agents build a set of zero probabilities, thus keeping their rule as well. Thus, irrespective of the rules, the system remains in a "frozen" state, with no further evolution. A similar situation is found with a population composed only by cooperative imitators and replicators. In this case, all agents receive R = 1 and thus have the same payoff. Therefore, there is no rule update, and the system is, too, in a frozen state. On the other hand, this is not the case when any of these rules are set against the Moran rule, where evolution does occur, and in most cases Moran players disappear. While all these are direct consequences of the design of our simulation, we have also found an interesting result regarding these locked situations, where no evolution is possible, namely that the presence of a small amount of a third type of agent may lead to evolution and, moreover, to a completely different state. Indeed, when these few agents can interact with at least one of the other type of (otherwise frozen) players, the system as a whole may evolve, even with the possibility of the extinction of one or more species, that otherwise would be present. We have not studied in detail this three update rule scenarios, but we envisage that the dynamics will be much richer and therefore deserves an in-depth analysis which is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a first attempt to provide an evolutionary rationale for the update rules used in spatially distributed models of emergence of cooperation. This is a key aspect of these models in so far as the choice of update rule largely influences the appearance and stabilisation of cooperation. In this context, our work must be viewed as a proposal for a general mechanism that would allow modellers to decide upon the rule of application in specific contexts. The main ingredient of this mechanism is the evolvability of update rules according to the same scheme as the strategies themselves, i.e., when an agent looks at her neighborhood and decides to copy the strategy of another agent, she also copies the agent's update rule. This procedure, that can be interpreted as learning in social contexts, has in turn a much more biological character than endogenous learning rules such as those introduced by Kirchkamp [1999] , that, to our knowledge, is the only other study where a evolutionary origin of learning rules has been explored. On the other hand, Kirchkamp [1999] considered a variety of games, while here we focus on the Prisoner's Dilemma in view of its applicability in a number of social, biological and even biochemical systems.
Our work has been carried out in two steps: first, we have studied the new features appearing when there are agents that use two different (but fixed) up-date rules in the lattice, and second, we have let the update rules themselves evolve in time. The first step has already given rise to interesting results, such as the decrease in the cooperation levels observed when agents use the UI update rule even when a small fraction of REP agents are introduced. As we have discussed in the text, this result must be taken into account when discussing the applicability of results obtained with a single rule, such as the emergence of cooperation in lattices of homogeneous UI agents [Nowak and May, 1992] . Nevertheless, this result becomes more relevant when compared to the situation in which update rules evolve: As we have shown above, in many instances evolution leads to the selection of one the update rules. When comparing rules of the type we have called "global", i.e., UI and MOR, we have seen that quite generally UI is selected and this in turn leads to large cooperation levels. We would thus have a scenario in which the choice of UI as the rule, such as in [Nowak and May, 1992] , can be evolutionarily justified. On the contrary, we have also found that the "local" REP rule, that in a complete graph leads to the standard replicator dynamics, is the selected one when confronting "global" rules, hindering the emergence of cooperation. Furthermore, we have been able to point to the selection mechanism for update rules: We have shown that, in general, rules that lead to less frequent strategy changes (and consequently to their own update in our model) tend to be selected. While we are convinced that this observation is at the core of the selection process, the results obtained when simulating the same update rule with two different characteristic times have also shown that the understanding of the process is far from complete.
We believe that our study opens the way to a much more complete analysis of the evolution of the update rules. It is clear that the present work asks for further research, regarding, e.g., the case in which three different update rules are present simultaneously. As we have advanced above, in this scenario much more complicated process may appear as the third rule helps other resist invasion by a dominant one. On the other hand, we have by no means exhausted the possible update rules, and a more thorough simulation program which would include more deterministic local rules is needed, in order to determine whether or not local rules invade global rules, or whether stochastic is better than deterministic. It would also be interesting to consider different time scales for the update of strategies and the update of learning rules. Thus, it is conceivable that an agent only changes her update rule after copying the strategy of the same neighbour a certain number of times. Mutations in the learning rule can also be included, and even heterogeneity in the details of the rule (for instance, different proportionality factors in the REP rule). These and other extensions of the present work should include in addition the comparison of the results of different games beyond the PD. We envisage that such a programme would be extremely useful for clarifying the big picture of evolutionary game theory on graphs and its applications.
